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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the implications of an endogenous moneysupply for the
perceived(by econometricians) and actual nonneutralityof money in rational
expectations models of the class put forward byLucas (1972, 1973) and Barro
(1976, 1980) that stress incomplete information. First,if there is contempo-
raneous policy response (e.g., to interest rates),then a simultaneous equa-
tions bias produces inconsistency in tests that use contemporaneousmonetary
statistics such as those proposed by King (1981) andBoschen-Grossman (1983).
Thus, an econometrician might erroneouslyconclude that money is nonneutral in
a fully classical model. Second, if moneyacts as a 'signal' about economic
conditions then autonomous (policy induced) changesin the money stock can
have real effects.In contrast to the nonneutrality of money in theLucas-
Barro analysis, which arises due to incompleteinformation about monetary








The Implications of an Endogenous Money Supply
for Monetary Neutrality
Thenonneutrality ot exogenous monetary changes in the rational expecta-
tions/monetarist models of Lucas (1972,1973) and Barro (1976,1980)arises as a
consequence of imperfect information. In these setups,economic agents do not
directly observe the quantity of money and, consequently, mistakenly perceive
changes in nominal prices as reflecting altered relative opportunities.
However, as King (1981) points out, if a monetary statisticis contemporane-
ously observable (even with some noise) then the Lucas-Barromodels predict a
zero correlation between output and monetary statistics, as perceivedvaria-
tions in money are neutral in these models. Using quarterly post-warU.S.
data, Boschen and Grossman (1982) find a significant non-zerocorrelation
between output and contemporaneous monetary statistics, whichleads to a
rejection of the Lucas-Barro model if agents are (plausibly)assumed to posess
such statistics.
If money is endogenous and observable, however, then importantmodifica-
tions of both theory and econometric procedures are necessary, as wedemon-
strate in this paper. First, even if money is fully neutral,endogeneity
implies that the zero-correlation hypothesistested by Boschen-Grossman is not
an implication of the rational expectations/monetaristmodels of Lucas and
Barro. We describe an econometric procedure that canhandle some forms of
this 'simultaneous equations' bias, producing a valid testof the neutrality
hypothesis. Second, if money serves as a 'signal'about economic conditions-
-say, because agents do not observe someother aggregate state variable with
'Helpfuldiscussions with John F. Boschen, Michael Dotsey, and Charles I.
Plosser are acknowledged. Herschel Grossman has contributed substantially
to clarifying the empirical implications of the model developedin Section
III.2
whichmoney is correlated- -then autonomous movements in money canhavereal
effects.This nonneutrality requires that money be observed by economic
agents, a polar opposite assumption to that made by Lucas and Barro. However,
for this nonneutrality to arise, it is still central that information is
imperfect, in the sense that agents are unable to observe all the shocks that
impact upon the system.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows.In section
I, we review the basic relationship between money and economic activity in
equilibrium models, using Barro's (1980) model as our organizing framework.
In section II, we look at neutrality tests under some alternative assumptions
about monetary information and the money supply process, working within a
model in which the contemporaneously perceived component of money is actually
neutral. We discuss some spurious rejections of the neutrality hypothesis
that may emerge when money is endogenous and suggest an econometric procedure
that deals with one class of these problems. In section III, our focus shifts
to an equilibrium model with a substantially different economic mechanism, in
which autonomous movements in a partly endogenous money aggregate are nonneu-
tral because they are a valuable, but imperfect, 'signals about economic
conditions. Section IV is a brief summary and conclusions.
I.Equilibrium Models, Expectations, and Money
The analysisinparts IIand III belowemploys a variantofthe business
cyclemodel constructed by Barro (1980). Here, we give a brief review of this
model and describe the special features that are important for our paper.
In common with the general class of models put forward by Lucas (1977),
there is a single final product that is traded in a large number of decentral-
ized exchange locations (z1,2,.. .,Z).In each location, the commodity supply







wherethe parameters a, ,and0 are all taken to be positive. As in Barro's
models (1976, 1980), commodity supply depends on a systematic component
(k(z)), the relevant rate of return fromthe perspective of market z
(r(z)), a local supplydisturbance ((z)), and on a wealth term, a(z).
Commodity demand is specified with symmetric, though opposfteinfluences.
The model also incorporates a permanent aggregate disturbance which
affects both supply and demand in the current period. In addition,commodity
demand is assumed to depend positively on the locally perceivedfuture value
of this disturbance (E11+i).2 One rationalization ofsuch a specification
would be that represents shifts in the marginal efficiencyof capital. The






>0).However, a complete analysis of capital accumula-
tion would involve many issues that are tangential tothe main issues of this
paper.
Local commodity market equilibrium determines a real rateof return and
quantity of output as functions of the variousshift variables discussed
above.
Throughout our discussion, we use the shorthandnotation Ext to denote the
rational expectation of the variable x, based on the informationset I(z)
possessed by agents in market z.
Lucas (1975), King (1981), and Trehan (1982) discuss aspectsof incorporat-















wherea = as +ad, s +dH = -Sadand G = aO +
Themarket clearing value of outputy(z) depends positively on locally
• sd sd . • 4 perceivedwealth ifH a -a>0,which will be assumed below,and
positivelyon the perceived value of the future disturbance
E11+1.The
discussion below will center on a(z) andEnt+1 as channels of influence for
monetary variables on real activity.
Since there is a nominal inside bond in Barro's model, the relevant real
rate of return from the perspective of market z isRt +P(z)
-
EPt+1,where
P(z) is the logarithm of the price in market z at date tandl+1 is the
logarithm of the general price level at date t+l.
The aggregate portfolio balance condition (5) specifies that thelogarithm
of the nominal money stock equals the logarithm of nominalmoney demand.
Nominal money demand depends positively on the general price level and the
level of economy-wide average real balancesT, which depends on economy-wide
average real income and the nominal interest rate (R) in conventional
ways.
(5)
"Barroand King (1982) point out that time separable preferences imply that
H0, so that this channel may not be relevant. Yet, for our generalpur-
poses this mechanism for monetary effects on real output is as good as any
other.5
s. d.
where M is the nominal money supply, Mt i nominal molley demand and is a
shift term. This condition and economy-wide averages of (3) and (4) determine
the price level and the nominal interest rate.
Following Archibald and Lipsey (1958) and Barro (1980), it is assumedthat
money is wealth only to the extent that there is a gapbetween real balances
held and those desired for transactions purposes, which neglects the income
effects of the flow of transactions services derived from money holding.
Specifically, we assume that a(z) =(Mt+ EM+i -EZPt+i)
-ETt+i.Impos-
ing the expected future version of the monetary equilibriumcondition (5) on
the model, it then follows that a(z) =Mt
-
EMt
(for a detailed discussion
and alternative derivation, see Barro (1980)).
Consequently, economy-wide average output depends on the money stock only
to the extent that variations in this quantity are not generally recognized to
be taking place. Now, assuming that =-1+ v, where V iS serially




— s d G+aSO
with y =-s--- k
+ 2.... +
2
where k is the economy-wide average value of k(z), etc. (Ext denotes an
economy-wide average expectation, here and below).
The expression for aggregate output (6) derived from our particularmodel
shares key features with other members of the class of equilibriumbusiness
cycle models put forward by Lucas, Barro and others. In particular,perceived
monetary disturbances--changes affecting Mt and EMt equally--areirrelevant
for output determination. Our model also incorporates a role forthe actual6
and perceived value of the aggregate disturbances,v, for which we have
suggested a technological interpretation.It should be pointed out that for
the bulk of our analysis, it is (6) that is key, rather than theparticular
structural model from which it is derived.
The Money Supply Process and Monetary Information
To close the model, it is necessary to specify how the quantity ofmoney
evolves over time. We assume that the money stock is the outcome of two
components, the money multiplier and the monetary base, so that the growth
rate of money may be divided into multiplier growth()andbase growth (hr).
(7)Mt M1 = +
ht
We make the following assumptions about the evolution of these components.
Each has a portion that is predictable on the basis of previous information,
which we denote E and E h .Theunpredictable component of money
t-l t-l
growth we denote m =- E + (h -Ehr). In the discussion below,
t-l t-l
we consider the following alternative assumptions about the exogeneity and
observability of m:
(8a)mt is not observable and is an independent, normal variable
(8b) is observable and is an independent, normal variable
(8c) m is the sum of two independent normal variables.The first,
=(h-Eh ),isobservable and the second,x. = - E
t-l t-l isnot.
(8d) m =P1v+ w and is observable
(8e)m =
Tp2(Rt-ERt) + w and is observable t
t-l7
where, in both (8d) and (8e), wt is an independent, normal variable.
In the former three specifications, the money supply is an exogenous
variable with respect to output, although three contrasting assumptions about
its observability by economic agents are made.First, (8a) represents the
Lucas-Barro hypothesis that agents do not posess contemporaneous monetary
statistics. Alternatively, as in King (1981) and Boschen-Grossman (1982),
(Sb) assumes that agents have contemporaneous monetary information.. Specifi-
cation (8c) represents an intermediate case where agents are assumed to
observe high powered money but not the monetary multiplier within the decision
period.
In the latter two specifications, we allow the money supply to be endoge-
nous and assume that it is observable by economic agents.In (8d) the money
supply reacts to the aggregate shock, v. Below, we discuss two alternative
interpretations for v and the reasons such a response may be observed.
Finally in (8e), this dependence is assumed to derive from a response to
nominal interest rate movements, a pattern of behavior that is frequently
asserted to describe central bank operating policies (see, for example, Poole
(1975)).In our setup, this dependence might plausibily derive from either
reserve management activities of banks that affect the growth of the multi-
plier ()orcentral bank operating policies that lead to a dependence of the
growth in the monetary base (hr) on the interest rate.
II. NeutralityTests
Thebasis for neutrality tests ii the observation that perceived monetary
growth does not affect output in Lucas-type business cycle models. However,
the elements of money that are unperceived depend in an essential way on the
information structure of the model. In this section we discuss some neutral-8
ity tests employing a output specification that is a special case of (6), in
that perceptions of real variables are irrelevant tooutput determination
(02=0).
Anticipated Money Growth
Barro and others have tested the neutrality of anticipatedmoney growth,
which is one implication of the sort of model we discuss here. Ifwe maintain
that money is not contemporaneously observable, it isnecessary to decompose
money into its anticipated and unanticipated components, because unanticipated
money can have real effects if it is also unperceived. Testing is complicated
because the construct unperceived money(Mt -EMt
=- Em)depends in
complicated ways on the elements of information sets. However, ifmoney is
not directly observable but agents do observe local prices and interest rates,
then it can be shown that unanticipated monetary events typically exerta
positive but less than one-to-one impact on unperceived money(mt -Em)
because agents learn about monetary shocks from the available price signals
(see Barro (1980) and King (1983) for some detailed discussions). Thus, under
our informational assumption (8a), there will be a causal, positive influence
of unanticipated money growth on output, which Lucas and Barro have stressed.
Anticipated money growth, which is perceived, will not have this property.
Contemporaneous Monetary Information
When contemporaneous monetary information is available, however, matters
are altered substantially. If money is accurately observable, as under our
assumption (8b), then the gap m -Emwill necessarily be zero if economic
agents use information efficiently. King (1981) discussed how this result
extends to models in which money is not accurately observed but, instead, is9
corrupted by a temporary measurement error. Essentially, since unperceived
money takes the form of an 'expectation error,' it should not be correlated
with any information variable that economic agents use to form expectations.
Thus, output should be uncorrelated with contemporaneously observed monetary
statistics, even if these are imperfect indicators of the stock of money.
That is, given that output depends on real variables and unperceived money, in
the restricted form of (6) that we are using,
= + -Em)+-v, then it followsthat a test of the neutral-
ity proposition may be obtained by a regression of output on contemporaneous
monetary statistics. The twin hypotheses of (i) neutrality of perceived money
growth and (ii) rational expectations based on contemporaneous information
imply a zero regression coefficient in this case.
Boschen (1981) and Boschen-Grossman (1982) employ such tests on quarterly
post-war data for the United States.5 Using a variety of specifications,
measures of money, and real activity, they document that estimated regression
coefficients typically differ from zero at conventional statistical levels.
One potential explanation of these results is that the relevant monetary
aggregate is only partly observed, which could correspond to our case (8c).
In this case, variations in the monetary base would be neutral--because they
were rapidly perceived--while variations in the money multiplier would be
In this quick summary of the Boschen-Grossmafl work, we gloss overthe
important contribution that their theoretical analysismakes to formulating
the neutrality test in an empirically tractable manner. The difficultyis
that actual money growth, Mt -Mt_l,
involves both an anticipated and
unanticipated component. In principle, spurious rejectionof the neutral-
ity hypothesis could emerge if there were a correlationbetween (antic-
ipated output) and E
- (anticipatedmoney) through the operation
t-1
of a feedback policy rule by the monetary authority. Twosolutions to this
potential problem appear available. The first is to'hold fixed' sepa-
rately the elements of in the regression. The second is to purge money
of its anticipated component.Boschen-Grossmafl opt for the former proce-
dure, which they implement empirically by viewing as a distributed lag
of past10
nonneutral.6 Hence, the correct formulationof the neutrality test using
contemporaneous monetary information would use the base rather thana broader
monetary aggregate. John Boschen has suggested to us that suchtests would
not result in rejection of the neutralityhypothesis, at least for the second
half of the post-war period, based onsome preliminary empirical results that
obtained in his thesis research (1981).This distinction is clearly worth
exploring in future empirical research.
Endogenous Unexpected Money
If the unpredictable movements inmoney, m, are endogenous--in the sense
of being correlated with autonomous determinants ofoutput, v, in the struc-
tural model above--then spurious rejections of theneutrality hypothesis may
occur even if it is actually true.To discuss this point and econometric
procedures that may be appropriate, we consider in turn thepolicy specifica-
tion (8d,e), each of which involves theassumption that agents accurately
observe the money stock. Consequently,unperceived money will be zero in each
case. For (8d) we take an alternative interpretation ofv, and let it repre-
sent government spending. This specification thenimplies that part of gov-
ernment spending is financed by printing newmoney.It is assumed that gov-
ernment spending is determined exogenously and that allspending is temporary,
so that =
Vthere. Notice that the issue of whether thespending is perma-
nent or temporary serves only to determine the size of the 8coefficients in
the supply and demand equations above.
Under these assumptions, (6) becomes =yt
+v. A regression of
output on money will produce a positive coefficient even when bothmoney and
government spending are perfectly observable due to the 'common effect' ofv.
G Boschen (1981,pp. 26-28) discusses the changing reporting procedures used
by the Federal Reserve System over the post-war period.11
Specification (8e) differs from the preceeding casein that money is
assumed to react to unpredictable changes in the nominal interest rate,which
is endogenous in the model considered above. In the present case, vcan be
interpreted either as a technological shock or ashock to government spending.
Then a simple regression of output on the contemporaneous monetarystatistic




-ERt, v)/var (mr). a
Thus, changes in money supply andoutputwill be positively correlated
(recall that the money supply reacts positively tointerest rate changes) as
long as the technological disturbance leadsto a higher interest rate. From
(3) above, this will be the case as long as >O.
Even if this is not
the case, the example above clearly brings outthe potential for spurious
rejections of the neutrality hypothesis.
If the parameters of the policy reaction function areknown, then it is
easy to correct for the correlationsdiscussed in the two examples above. In
these cases all that is required is to make an adjustmentfor that part of the
change in money supply which is endogenous.A regression of y on
(m -2(R
-ERt)) would then bethe correct method of testing for neu-
tt-l
trality. More generally, the parameter b2
could be estimated if we had one or
more exogenous variables that affectedthe nominal interest rate. A second
stage test of the neutrality hypothesiscould use the estimated valu3 of
It bears emphasizing that in both the examplesabove money is fully neu-
tral, i.e., variations in money supply have noeffect on output. The positive
correlation between observed money and output occurssolely as a result of12
permitting money to be endogenous. Further, endogeneitymay provide an alter-
native explanation for Boschen's finding that theneutrality hypothesis cannot
be rejected if the monetary base is usedas the relevant aggregate. To the
extent that the multiplier is 'more' endogenous than thebase, the discussion
indicates that it would be more highly correlated withoutput than the lat-
ter.
Ill.Money as a Signal
Inthis section, we introduce the possibility thatautonomous monetary
disturbances are nonneutral because agents viewmonetary statistics as convey-
ing valuable information about economic conditions.In principle, the sig-
nalling role could arise either because the monetary authorities hadaccess to
superior information or, more plausibly, because themoney supply responds
endogenously to aggregate state variables that are not directly observable.
For the present purposes, it is key that themoney stock is observable
(though it need not be observed without noise) and endogenous,so that we
employ specification (8d) above. Further, we maintain the imperfect informa-
tion assumption in the sense that agents cannot observe theaggregate distur-
bances w andv that hit the system. For concreteness, we interpret v as
the current shock to technology, so that thecurrent state of technology is
given by =t-l+ v. Under the policy rule (8d),money reacts directly to
the technology shockv, i.e., m = + w, and also involves an autonomous
component w. Such a positive endogenous response(4 > U) may occur, for
example, if a sudden realizatio.-i of profitable investmentopportunities
The bulk of the business cycle correlation betweenoutput and monetary
magnitudes is with banking system measures.For example, Friedman and
Schwartz (1963, Chapter 7) stress that changes in themoney multiplier
represent the major source of monetary change throughout the Great Contrac-
tion. Working from a different perspective, King and Plosser(1981) show
that high powered money is weakly correlated withoutput fluctuations while
deposits are significantly positively correlated over the post warperiod.13
induces firms to borrow from banks.
As previously, output 'determination is influenced by unperceived money
-Em),
the technology shock v and the economy-wide average perceived
value of the technology shock CE vt), as shown in (6) above. However, under
our assumption that money is accurately observable, it is directthat




This expression emphasizes that the expectational channel by which money can
be nonneutral is Evt, the perceived value of the technology shock.
The nature of the rational expectations solution for Evt as a function of
information variables depends on the information set, which in principle would
involve the current money supply, the nominal interest rate and the local
price. However, a full-blown solution for Ev becomes extremely complicated
in this model if several signals are used (see, for example, Barro (1980) in
which there are two signals). Therefore, for illustrative purposes, we first
discuss expectation formation under the assumption that the only signal that
agents possess is the current money stock.
Given the linear normal structure of the model, it follows that agents'
one signal rule will take the following simple form.
(11) Evt = v + w)
2 22 2. .
where= t1 °v'i
+ 0) is the population coefficient for a regres-
sion of v on m. Further, given that the monetary signal is assumed tobe
the only source of information, expectations do not differ across markets.
Thus, it follows that average expectations Ev respond by less thanone-to-14
one with v (since 0 < < 1) and positively to autonomous monetary shocks
if there is a positive relationship between money and technology shocks
> 0).In this case, random increases in the money supply raise output,
according to (10) above, because agents treat these fluctuations as signalling
positive movements in v, e.g., indicating an increase in the future profit-
ability of investment.
The fact that the output effect of autonomous movements in money (we) is
positive (given 4 > 0) is easily seen.Substituting (11) in (10) gives a




Vt + Wt] + vt
Further, using policy specification (8d), we obtain
(13)Cov[(y -y)(M-Mi)]=-{a02 + G) l 0v
which is unambiguously positive for *1 > 0.Therefore, the coefficient
obtained from regressing output on money will be positive.
Thus, in the present model, (12) demonstrates that there is a true causal
relationship that exists between autonomous monetary movements (wv) and out-
put, with a positive influence existing so long as agent's perceptions of the
unobservable real aggregate shock (vt) are positively related to the observed
2 22 2
aggregate (i.e., Z =p o/(4l + o) > 0). Further, there is a posi-
tive covariance between output and measured money under the same conditions
> 0), in view of (13).
However, the covariance calculated in (13) is not informative about the
empirical relevance of the key element of this model, which is the nonneutral-
ity mechanism.8 Specifically, suppose that one adopts the alternative hypothe-
8 We thank Herschel Grossman for pointing out this equivalence to us and
stressing its implications.15
sis--advanced, for example, by King and Plosser (l98l)--that attributes the
comovements of money and output to the fact that these variables both respond
to aggregate real shocks that are observable by economic agents.In the






which follows from (10) above by replacing Ev with v. This model also
generates the covariance (13), which in fact will be produced by anymodel in
which money is a common component of the information set on which Evt is
based.9
That this covariance is silent on the predictions of our model implies
that empirical strategies must isolate contemporaneously unperceived compo-
nents of autonomous money growth (our w) to test the key predictions of our
model, i.e., the expectational nonneutrality displayed in (10) versus alterna-
tive theories (such as (10)'). We are presently investigating the feasibility
of some alternative empirical strategies.One attractive possibility1° is to
examine the implications of money supply previously
by Cornell (1983), Engel and Frankel (1982) and others--in the contextof our
theory, particularly investigating implications for interest rates, commodity
prices and production.





A basic property of rational expectations is that the expectation error
(Vt -Ev)
will always be uncorrelated with elements of I(z), such as
money growth in our setup.
10 Suggested to us by Michael Dotsey, who points out that Cornell finds
statistically significant interest rate effects of Ml surprisesand
insignificant base impacts over several recent intervals.16
The above discussion proceeded under the maintainedhypothesis that money
was the only source of contemporaneous information. Althoughwe have not
worked out a solution to the complete model with threesignals, we provide
some speculations based on results of parallel studies. First, it will be
necessary for there to be at least three aggregate shocks if the money stock
and interest rate are to be prevented from fullyrevealing all relevant infor-
mation. Thus, for example, temporary supply or demand shocks would haveto be
added to the model.
Second, when there are more signals, it is likely that the extent of
agents' reliance on the money supply ()willbe reduced.Intuitively, this
is because the additional information reduces the relianceon any one signal
(subject to certain restrictions on the covariance matrix ofv and the sig-
nals). Further, agents' expectations will be more precise as more information
is added.11 However, it is unlikely that these considerations will alterthe
direction of the channel outlined above, although themagnitude of money
supply effects may be reduced.
Thus, we have provided an example of the general idea thatmoney may be
nonneutral because it acts as a signal.In contrast to Lucas and Barro, a
positive correlation of autonomous money (we) and outputemerges as a result
of contemporaneous monetary information rather than in the absence ofsuch
data.
IV.Summary and Conclusions
Previousstudies of the nonneutrality of money (Lucas, Barro) have made
the critical assumption that the currentmoney supply cannot be observed.
Further, these studies have also assumed that the money supply is determined
'Noticethat this argument overlooks difficulties arising from the fact
that the information content of signals is endogenous insetups such as
those discussed above.17
exogenously. In this paper, we have shown that relaxing the second assumption
has important consequences for the neutrality of money- -both perceived (by
econometricians) and actual. Once money is permitted to be endogenous, posi-
tive comovements in money and output can be obtained even if the current money
stock is known to agents.
Above, we analyzed two different situations.In the first case, money
reacts to variables which are themselves directly observable. Money is neu-
tral in this case, yet regressions of output on money can produce positive
coefficients.In the second case, money acts as a signal for some variable
which is itself not directly observable.Here, money is no longer neutral.
Changes in the money supply bring about changes in real activity, with a
positive comovement being a plausible occurrence.18
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